Preliminary and incomplete -not for citation. We introduce a cost of location into Hotelling's (1929) spatial duopoly. We derive the general conditions on the cost-of-location function under which a pure strategy price-location Nash equilibrium exists. We then illustrate this result with several speci…c functional forms of the cost-of-location function.
Introduction
To paraphrase Stigler (1964) , no one has the right to invite attention to another extension of Hotelling (1929) without advance indication of the justi…cation for doing so. Our justi…cation is the observation that in a literature where what matters is "location, location, location," 1 location itself has been treated as a free good. Since economics is sometimes referred to as "the science of scarcity,"this seems an odd speci…cation for economists to make, and we introduce a rental cost of location that rises moving closer to the center of the line to Hotelling duopoly. 2 d' Aspremont et al. (1979) show that existence of a pure strategy price equilibrium in Hotelling duopoly requires that …rms not locate "too close"to the center of the line. Osborne and Pitchik's (1987) numerical analysis shows that in a two-stage location choice, price-setting game, equilibrium locations are within the region where equilibrium prices follow mixed strategies.
One interpretation is that Hotelling implicitly assumed the cost of location to be independent of location, normalized it to 0 for simplicity, and that the literature has followed this approach. However, it is of interest to consider the case of location costs that di¤er by location. In Europe, centercity locations are typically more expensive than those on the periphery. The same was true of the United States through the mid-1950s, and the opposite tends to be true of the United States today.
We consider a two-stage model, with location choice in the …rst stage, followed by price setting in a standard Hotelling-line duopoly. At the pricing stage, the cost of location is a …xed cost; it does not in ‡uence the equilibrium price. When we turn our attention to the …rst stage, we derive the general condition on the cost of location curve that should be met for an equilibrium to exist in Hotelling's original setting. One view of the result is that we …nd conditions under which location costs ensure the existence of a purestrategy location-price equilibrium. We illustrate this result for a particular family of cost-of-location functions, and for this case, equilibrium locations are bounded away from the ends of the line and satisfy the condition identi…ed 
Literature
The literature that ‡ows from Hotelling (1929) is vast. Extensions include 3 a …nite reservation price (Lerner and Singer (1937) , Salop (1979) , Economides (1984) , Hinloopen and Van Marrewijk (1999) ), a circular road (Chamberlin (1953), Vickrey (1964 Vickrey ( /1999 , Samuelson (1967) , Salop (1979) , Economides (1986)) and graphs (Soetevent, 2010) Hotelling (1929) , the market consists of a line of …nite length l, along which consumers are uniformly distributed. There are two …rms, A and B, located at distances a and b respectively from the left and right ends of the line. Without loss of generality, we suppose that …rm A is located to the left of …rm B. Both …rms supply a homogeneous product that yields gross surplus v. v is large enough that all consumers always buy. 4 Consumers have unit demand, and a consumer located at x (measured from the left side of the market) experiences net surplus
when buying from …rm A, where t > 0 is the transportation rate, and p i is the price charged by …rm i, i = A; B, and
if the product is bought from …rm B. The location of the marginal consumer follows from U (x; a) = U (x; b):
Fixed and marginal cost of production are constant, and equal to zero. Let c(y) > 0 be the location cost function, where y is the distance from the …rm's location to the nearest end of the line (a for …rm A, b for …rm B). We assume that c is twice continuously di¤erentiable. In a familiar way, now allowing for the cost of location, the objective functions of …rm A and B (conditional on prices and locations) are
and
The existence of location cost rules out back-to-back, zero-price equilibria (which would imply negative payo¤s). Conditions for the existence of pure-strategy price equilibria with …rms at di¤erent locations are due to d 'Aspremont et al. (1979) ; we state them in the form given by Martin (2002) . Aspremont et al. (1979) ) If a + b < l, a pure-strategy price equilibrium exists if, and only if
If (6) and (7) are satis…ed, equilibrium prices and payo¤s, given locations, are
where asterisks denote second-stage equilibrium values, taking locations as given.
Proof. d'Aspremont et al. (1979).
As d'Aspremont et al. remark, for symmetric locations, (6) and (7) simplify to
Stage 1: choice of location
Proposition 2 Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a pure-strategy location-price equilibrium are that (6) and (7) be satis…ed for locations satisfying the location …rst-order conditions
(provided the implied a 0, b l), the location second-order conditions 
Proof. Substitute (8) and (9) into (10) and (11), respectively, to obtain expressions for the …rst-stage objective functions. The …rst-and second-order conditions are immediate. The …rst-order conditions imply that equilibrium is symmetric. Then
With (10) and the requirement that equilibrium payo¤s be nonnegative, one obtains (17) . Similarly for (18).
Example I
For illustrative purposes, let t = l = 1, and let the location cost function take the form c (y) = y ;
for y = a, b (now omitting asterisks where possible without confusion, for notational compactness). Note that if > 1, the location cost function (20) corresponds to a proper fraction raised to a power greater than 1. 5 Larger values of then imply smaller location cost (see Figure 1) .
We assume equilibrium occurs where …rms set pure strategy prices, and derive consistency conditions for this to be the case. For …rm A (13) gives the …rst-order condition (likewise for …rm B)
from which the symmetric equilibrium follows
5 As will be shown below, > 1 is one of the conditions for the existence of a purestrategy price-location equilibrium. For (22) to be valid, the equilibrium it identi…es must satisfy four conditions (i) the second-order condition of the location stage, (ii) the d'Aspremont et al. condition (12) , (iii) the condition that pro…ts are non-negative, and (iv) the stability condition in location space.
The second-order condition is
which requires > 1. Note that lim #1 a = 0. Condition (12) implies that 
Then, using (10) or (17), …rm A's equilibrium payo¤ is
which is positive 8 > 1. Finally, necessary conditions for stability are that the trace of the matrix of second-order partial derivatives of payo¤s functions be negative, and the determinant positive, when evaluated at equilibrium , a condition that is less binding than (23) . Figure 2 shows bests response curves and equilibrium locations for two values of , = 2:1 and = 2:3. 6 Bestresponse lines slope downward: location choices are strategic substitutes. A larger value of means smaller location cost, all else equal, and (as one expects), the equilibrium location shifts toward the center of the line as increases.
In sum, the price-location pair (p ; a ) = 1; (3 ) 1 1 is a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the Hotelling model with linear transportation cost and cost of location (22) 
The location of the marginal consumer is now given by
from which the pro…ts of both …rms conditional on price and location follow
and Aspremont et al. (1979) show that for this situation, a unique price equilibrium exists for any locations a and b, and that it is given by
Stage 2: choice of location
Proposition 3 Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a pure-strategy location-price equilibrium are the location …rst-order conditions
(provided the implied a 0, b l), the location second-order conditions
and the participation constraints
Proof. Substitute (31) and (32) into (29) and (30), respectively, to obtain expressions for the …rst-stage objective functions. The …rst-and second-order conditions are immediate. The …rst-order conditions imply that equilibrium is symmetric. Then
from which the participation constraints (37) and (38) follow.
Example II
with > 0. This location cost function implies lower cost towards the centre of the market. In case of symmetric locations. The …rst-order condition (33) boils down to:
which yields, using (40)
The condition that 0 a 1=2 translates into 1=6 1=2. For these values of the second-ordere condition (35) is satis…ed Straightforward calculations show that participation constraint (37) requires that 1 < 1=2 [ 3 < 1. That is, 8 2 [1=6; 1=2] the price-location pair (p ; a ) = (3(1 6 )=2; (6 1)=4) is a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation cost and location cost function (40). In particular, for = 1=2 we have (p ; a ) = (0; 1=2) and the participation constraint is just met. That is, in equilibrium …rms supply a homogeneous good and charge a price equal to their marginal cost, yielding exactly zero pro…ts. Figure ? ? illustrates.
In sum, adding a cost of location to the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs can reverse the conclusion of d 'Aspremont et al (1979) . In particular, it can yield the situation of (endogenous) minimum di¤eren-tiation that does not su¤er from the problems in Hotelling (1979) . Note in passing that the existence of the Bertrand paradox as derived here is not based on a discrete argument (whereby undercutting yields the entire market), but through a 'smooth'optimization excercise.
Conclusion
We have motivated our speci…cation with the observation that rent varies with location. In European cities (as in the United States through the …rst half of the twentieth century), rent tends to rise moving toward metropolitan centers. We have examined the consequences of such a rent-location relationship in a model that assumes a uniform distribution of consumers, and …nd that pure-strategy location-price equilibrium locations are located in a band that is, in general, bounded away from both the end and the center of the line -rather than minimum or maximum di¤erentiation, location cost induces intermediate degrees of di¤erentiation, with less di¤erentiation as location cost is more sensitive to distance.
We envisage extending the present work to derive the equilibrium rentlocation relationship from the distribution of the population. This will permit us to examine conditions leading to the hollowing-out of center cities that is observed in the United States from the latter part of the twentieth century.
